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In policy advice for developing economies, macroeconomic  analysts often recommend
tightened fiscal control. Some observers, especially weary residents of adjustment-
fatigued developing economies, suspect that fiscal control has become a mat.ter  of dogma
rather than practical policy imperative, and that no amount of fiscal tightening is ever
quite enough for most macroeconomic analysts. This paper discusses one short-term
analytical approach to the question of how far a fiscal deficit must be reduced (or surplus
increased) to meet a government's macroeconomic objectives.
Section 1 discusses the basic approach and features of the exercise.  Section 2 provides a
summary exposition of the model's core procedure.  Section 3 sets out the variables used
in the detailed forecasting model. Section 4 lists the forecasting assumptions.  Section 5
sets out the model. Section 6 discusses the interpretation of the forecasting results.
Section 7 discusses the appropriate capital level for a central bank to maintain.  Section 8
provides some concluding remarks. An Annex reports results of a spreadsheet
application to the case of Ecuador in mid-1999.
1. The basic approach and features of the exercise
This paper describes a spreadsheet model that estimates the government deficit consistent
with quantitative settings of a typical "vector" of macroeconomic objectives, including
(i) year-over-year real-GDP growth; (ii) price-level growth; (iii) exchange-rate evolution;
and (iv) international-reserve accumulation. For any given future year, if these variables
took on their programmed values, the economy would be willing to hold certain stocks of
government and central-bank obligations, according to the model's asset-demand
functions. In principle, the changes in these stocks summed together would indicate the
(maximum) flow of financing instruments the government and central bank could issue
into the domestic financial system. The net governnent borrowing flow consistent with
the macroeconomic objectives then follows from summing this flow with the flow of net
external financing to the government (taken here to be exogenously given).
("Government" may be defined narrowly as just the "central government" or broadly to
encompass the entire non-financial public sector, so long as the exercise maintains a
consistent definition.)
The core of the exercise is a monetary-programming  calculation of the (maximum
allowable) increase in the central bank's net balance-sheet position vis-a-vis  the
government. In the process, the exercise determines the associated central-bank profit-
and-loss flow and shows its effect on the maximum allowable government deficit. The
net increase in government external debt outstanding and the increase in the central
bank's net international-reserve position are taken to be exogenously given (either taken
from an external-accounts forecasting exercise based on the same macroeconomic
programming objectives, or simply set as assumptions). The government is assumed to
borrow from (i) external financing sources, (ii) the central bank (in net termns,  i.e.,
including any reduction in the government's deposit account at the central bank), and
(iii) domestic financial markets (including commercial banks, excluding the central
bank).  The exercise determines the amounts these sources together could provide the
3government, consistent with the macroeconomic programming objectives, external-
accounts conditions, supplementary policy instruments, and other behavioral
assumptions.
The model presented here should be thought of as part of a broader macroeconomic
framework for an economy, one fundamental purpose of which is to determine whether a
specified government expenditure program would be fully financed if its economy's
performance were to turn out according to the vector of programming objectives. The
narrower purpose of the present model is to determine the financing flows that would be
available to finance the public deficit if the vector of programming assumptions were to
occur. That is, the present model is part of a macroeconomic "consistency" analysis.
Economists sometimes disparage consistency exercises of this kind as "just simple
adding-up exercises," noting, fairly enough, that they represent no general- or partial-
equilibration processes and incorporate only limited assumptions about behavioral
responses to incentives. Consistency models can be useful, however, when used
appropriately. It would be methodologically inappropriate, for example, to use the
present model for prediction: the fact that the model indicates that a given public deficit
would be consistent with a given assumption vector by no means implies that the deficit
and assumption vector are likely to occur. It would also be inappropriate to claim that the
present model simulates the actual macroeconomic processes leading to the outcomes
represented by the programming vector. The most appropriate applications of the model
described here would undoubtedly be macroeconomic resource-planning exercises. It
would be helpful to a policy analyst, for example, to determine that a particular
programmed government deficit would require a larger flow of saving and credit
resources than the assumption vector would imply. A claim of consistency is a claim of
one kind of feasibility-i.e.,  in this model, resource adequacy. An inconsistent deficit
and assumption vector would presumably not both be possibie, and so such models can
be used to reject unfeasible deficit-vector pairings. While this may seem unexciting for
analysts aiming to predict the future, in many contexts this kind of determination can be
useful for policy planning exercises.
Consistency exercises of this kind are carried out daily by national macroeconomic
policy-makers, with varying degrees of detail and variations in methodology.  The
International Monetary Fund's basic monetary programming analysis is a consistency
exercise, as is the World Bank's RMSM-X model.  (The familiar Leontiev "input-output"
model is another kind of consistency exercise: one way of describing its purpose is that it
determines whether an economy's resource base is consistent with prograrnmed output.)
Several particular features of the present model should be noted at the outset. It takes
account not only of the central bank's balance sheet (stock and flow), but also of the
central bank's own profit flow. (This is often called "the quasi-fiscal" surplus, although
in some countries the expression also refers to other public-sector surpluses or deficits
not counted in the main government accounts.) In itself, a central-bank profit flow is a
source of monetary absorption, while a loss flow is a source of monetary expansion. This
can significantly affect an economy's monetary aggregates, and may thereby significantly
increase or reduce the maximum allowable net government borrowing flow. For
exarnple, interest eamed on international reserves is part of a central bank's international-
reserve inflow.  Since in most cases this interest is capitalized into the international-
4reserve accounts, it has no direct monetary consequence. When calculating the sources
of base-money expansion, however, the reserve inflow corresponding to the interest
inflow may be taken to generate expansion, while the corresponding profit inflow
presumably generates a precisely offsetting contraction. A similar example is revaluation
of international reserves as a consequence of exchange-rate depreciation. Again, this has
no monetary consequence: in the accounting of base-money expansion, the reserve
"inflow" corresponding to the appreciation of the reserve stock in domestic-currency
terms presumably generates expansion, while the corresponding profit inflow generates a
precisely offsetting contraction. For a given maximum monetary expansion under a
monetary program, where a central bank's profits or losses are significant, .failure  to take
them into account can produce a corresponding over- or under-estimate of the maximum
net financing a central bank can provide to its government.
Another important aspect of the present model is its way of taking account of year-end
and year-average values. The model uses year-average values for the price level,
exchange rate, and demand functions for money and government obligatiorns. These are
taken to be averages of the respective year-end values for the current and preceding
years. The averages are taken to be weighted geometric averages, with weighting to take
account of "seasonality." Thus, for example, as discussed below, the model takes the
year-average domestic price level p to be given by
P  P- 1[  (P)1  ZPZ)
where p is the year-end price level and z(p) the exchange-rate "seasonality" coefficient.
The "neutral" value of the seasonality coefficient, i.e., the value representing absence of
seasonality, would be 0.5. A value of z(p) exceeding 0.5 would indicate more rapid
inflation earlier in the year; that is, the year-end value would weigh more heavily than the
previous year-end value in determining the year-average value.  (In actual spreadsheet
exercises, these seasonality assumptions can also be used to help "fudge" near-term
forecasts of price-level and exchange-rate variables following a base year in which their
actual evolution followed a highly irregular pattern.)
The present exposition takes the array of real interest rates to be exogenous.  This is a
simplifying approach, intended partly to avoid overloading the present exposition, partly
to simplify the basic spreadsheet analysis. Being presented as exogenous in this way,
there is no assurance, of course, that any array chosen is consistent with asset-demand
functions, nor even with indebtedness ratios. This problem can be addressed by adding in
the appropriate asset-demand functions and assumptions about their main parameters.
The interest rate on govermment  obligations could, for example, be incorporated in
demand functions for money, government and central-bank non-monetary obligations,
and these then solved simultaneously for mutually consistent real interest rates. A
demand function for central-bank non-monetary obligations could also be set out
explicitly (instead of assuming, as described below, that the central bank issues its
obligations into a financial market indifferent between them and government
obligations).
5The approach described here is, of course, just one way of thinking about one aspect of
the problem of determining appropriate fiscal policy. Its perspective is fundamentally
short-term (at most, medium-term), whereas in many contexts policy-makers may be best
advised to set their policy according to longer-tern criteria. It focuses on "below-the-
line" fiscal constraints, without considering the composition of revenue and expenditure,
much less their effects on real output growth (which is taken here as a programming
assumption). In sum (as always), the analytical tools described here are best used along
with, and in the proper balance, with others.
2. A summary exposition of the model
The core of the exercise is a calculation of how much a central bank's net lending to a
govemment could increase over a period in which it issues a given amount of base
money. Consider a simple central bank whose period-end balance sheet consists of
(i) net government obligations (F), (ii) other assets (representedfor this section only by
A), (iii) the monetary base (B), and (iv) the central bank's net worth (V). The average
interest rates over the year on government obligations and on other assets are given,
respectively,for this section only, by "f'  and "a" (the monetary base is assumed to pay
no interest).  Since the flow balance sheet over any time period is given by
AB + AV =  AF +  AA,
the (maximum) increase in AF should be given by
AF  =  AB - AA +  AV.
Suppose that AB, the flow increase in the monetary base B, is consistent, through a
money multiplier and a demand-for-money function, with a programming vector of
macroeconomic objectives, and assume that AA, the flow increase in the central bank's
assets other than net government obligations, is exogenously given. Assuming there is no
other source of new capital over the course of the year, the value of AV would be given
by the interest earnings on the year-average stocks of the central bank's asset holdings,
AV =  f(F 1 +  F)/2 +  a(A  1 +  A)/2,
where F 1 and A1 are the previous period-end stocks (the period-average stock being
taken to equal the average of the stocks at the beginning and end of the year).  Since
F_  +F  =  F1 +(AF/2)
and
A_ 1 + A  A1 + (AA/2),
AV =  f [F_ + (AF/2)] + a [A_ + (AA/2)].
6Substituting this last expression into the balance-sheet identity and solving for  AF gives
the net increase in the financing the central bank could provide the government,
consistent with AB, AA, "f" and "a":
AF  =  {AB - AA +  [aA_1 +  (aAA/2)  +fF 1 ]}/{l  - (f/2)}.
The meaning of this expression can be seen by first setting the interest rates "f" and "a"
to zero. In this case, the net increase in net financing the central bank could provide the
government would simply be the monetary base less AA. Suppose next that "a" and AA
are greater than zero, but that "f ' is still zero. In this case, since the central bank would
earn a profit of
aA_1 + (aAA/2),
it would have additional resources it could provide the government, all other things being
equal (if AA is very much less than zero, of course, the central bank would have fewer
resources to provide the government). Finally, since "f'  is greater than zero, the central
bank would have still more resources it could provide the government. Not only would it
have the interest earnings from the stock of government obligations at the end of the
previous year, f F_ , it would also have the intra-year interest earnings on the government
obligations the central bank would acquire during the present year (represenLted  by the
expression in the denominator of the right-hand side of the formula above for AF). In
effect, of course, the central bank would lend these resources to the government to
finance the interest due to the central bank.  To the extent the central bank earns interest
from the government, of course, its financing goes in part for this use.
The model presented in the three sections following is a more thorough (although,
unfortunately, more complicated) version of this simple monetary-programrning exercise.
3. The model's variables
The model's notation conventions are as follows. A bar over the variable indicates a
period-average value, while absence of a bar indicates a period-end value. The symbol
Ax is read "change in x over the preceding period," and gx is read "growth rate of x" (i.e.,
Axx_1 ). In general, upper case letters indicate asset or liability stocks, except for Y
which represents nominal GDP. Asterisks denote values denominated in foreign
exchange (U.S. dollars). Real interest rates are denoted by "r," with subscripts indicating
the asset or liability stock to which the rate applies. Nominal interest rates are denoted by
"n".  An asterisk indicates an international U.S. dollar rate.  Thus, for example,
rT represents the period-average real interest rate on government domestic obligations;
nT the corresponding nominal interest rate; and  H*E represents the nominal period-
average international U.S. dollar interest rate on external government obligations.
7The variables used in the model are as follows:
Y  Nominal gross domestic product (GDP);
Y  Real GDP;
Y*  Nominal GDP measured in U.S. dollars;
pi  Period-average domestic price level;
P  The period-end domestic price level;
p  *  Period-average (U.S.-dollar) world price level;
p  Period-end world price level;
e  Period-average (domestic currency per U.S. dollar);
E  Period-end exchange rate;
M  Period-average broad money supply;
M  Period-end broad money supply;
C  Period-average currency in circulation;
C  Period-end currency in circulation;
B  Period-end monetary base;
A *  Period-average gross central-bank external assets;
A*  Period-end gross central-bank external assets;
L *  Period-average central-bank external liabilities;
L*  Period-end central-bank external liabilities;
R  Period-average commercial-bank reserves (central-bank obligations);
R  Period-end commercial-bank reserves;
H  Period-average central-bank credit to commercial banks;
H  Period-end central-bank credit to commercial banks;
Q  Period-average government deposit balance at the central bank;
8Q  Period-end government deposit balance at the central bank;
U  Period-average central-bank non-monetary obligations;
U  Period-end central-bank non-monetary obligations;
F  Period-average central-bank credit to the government;
F  Period-end central-bank credit to the government;
T  The sum of period-average net central government obligations and
central-bank non-monetary obligations to domestic financial markets;
T  The sum of period-end net central government obligations and central-
bank non-monetary obligations to domestic financial markets;
E *  Period-average net central government foreign currency ob]ligations  to
external creditors;
E*  Period-end net central government foreign currency obligations to
external creditors;
K  The government's period-end capital position in the central bank; and
Z  The government deficit (in domestic currency).
Also, 'IA'  nL, nE,  n-H, fQ,  F'  R  i  I-,  and H, represent the respective nominal
interest rates on the central-bank assets, central-bank liabilities, and government
obligations A*, L*, E*, H, Q, F, R, U, and (T-U). In addition, x(M) and x(T) represent
the elasticities of money demand and government and central-bank domestic obligations,
respectively, with respect to real GDP. As noted above, the model uses "seasonality
coefficients": the coefficient for the exchange rate e is given by z(e), the coefficient for
the price level p is given by z(p), and so on. Finally, vH represents the percentage value
increase in the central bank's holdings of commercial-bank obligations.  (A negative
value of vH, for example, could represent a credit loss on a liquidity loan by the central
bank to a commercial bank.)
4. Forecasting assumptions
For each forecast year the model requires seven groups of assumptions, (A) basic
macroeconomic programming objectives, (B) certain external-accounts flowvs,  (C) flow
9changes in components of the central bank's domestic credit, (D) nominal interest rates,
(E) behavioral parameters, and (F) seasonality coefficients, and (G) the valuation change
in the central bank's assets and liabilities. For each forecast year, the basic
macroeconomic programming objectives are as follows:
(A.  1)  gy  year-over-year growth rate of real GDP;
(A.2)  g_  year-over-year growth rate of the average price level;
and
(A.3)  g9_  year-over-year growth rate of the average exchange rate.
These values may be assumed directly or calculated from other assumptions.  For
example, the growth rate of the average price level can be calculated from an assumed
year-end to year-end price-level growth rate.  Since
3  P  p_[1  z(p)] pz(p)
Pi = P  1+  gp=  p_  Ir  Z(P)]  [P 1  1  + gp)] Z(p),
so that
(1 + g)  =  [Pi,/P]  [1 + gp)] Z(P).
Next, for each forecast year, several assumptions are required regarding the external
accounts:
(B.  1)  A*  U.S. dollar value of the central bank's gross
external assets;
(B.2)  L*  U.S. dollar value of the central bank's external
liabilities;
(B.3)  E*  U.S. dollar value of the government's external
debt;
(B.4)  -nA  average interest rate on gross international assets;
(B.5)  nL  average interest rate on the central bank's external debt;
10and
(B.6)  iiE  average interest rate on the government's external debt.
These values may be assumed directly or calculated from other assumptions. Thus, for
example, the increase in the central bank's gross external assets can be calculated by
assuming that the central bank will aim to end the period with a reserve stock equal to
some number of months of imports of goods and non-factor services.
Next, the model requires assumptions regardingflow changes in components of the
central bank's domestic credit:
(C. 1)  AH  the increase in commercial-bank  obligations to the central bank;
(C.2)  AU  the increase in central-bank non-monetary obligations (including
open-market intervention instruments);
(C.3)  A'F  the programmed minimum increase in the central bank's claims on
the government;
(C.4)  A'Q  the programmed minimum increase in the government's deposit
account at the central bank; and
(C.5)  AK  the net increase in the government's capital position in the central
bank.
The flow value AK is positive to the extent the government increases its equity holding
and negative to the extent it withdraws capital, e.g., receives a dividend payment.  These
assumptions may be derived from assumptions about their real or nominal growth rates,
or from other relationships. For example, the government may be assumed to end each
period with a deposit balance at the central bank equal to some given percentage of the
preceding year's  GDP.
An important point to note here is that the flow increases in the balance-sheet values are
taken to incorporate capitalized interest and valuation increases. Thus, for example, AH,
the change in the central bank's outstanding credit to commercial banks, includes (i) net
new lending to commercial banks, (ii) interest accrued on such lending, and (iii) any
valuation change in the credit stocks that may have occurred. Thus, for example, in
setting the assumption for AH for any particular year, the accrued interest and valuation
change assumptions (D. 1) and (G.  1) should be taken into account accordingly.
Nominalperiod-average interest rates on the central-bank assets and liabilities H, F, R,






Government obligations are assumed to yield nominal interest of
(D.6)  HT'
The respective  period-average  real interest rates are  iTH  ,  rR  ,  ,  X  ,  7  and r-T.  The
nominal interest rates may be assumed directly, or instead the real values may be
assumed, and the inflation rate then used to calculate the nominal rate.  For example, if
rH represents the real interest rate on H, the corresponding period-average nominal
interest rate could be taken to be given by
nH  =  [(  + rH ) (lgp)]  -.
(In a spreadsheet, setting out the interest-rate assumptions in real terms and calculating
the nominal rate using this formula has the advantage of pernitting  automatic changes in
nominal interest rates when the inflation assumption is changed.)
Assumptions regarding behavioralparameters comprise the following:
(E. l)  k  commercial banks' marginal reserve ratio;
(E.2)  m  the marginal money multiplier;
(E.3)  x(M)  the elasticity of money demand with respect to real GDP; and
(E.4)  x(T)  the elasticity of demand for government and central-bank domestic
obligations with respect to real GDP.
In the formula for the marginal money multiplier, the values of k and m are taken to be
behavioral parameters rather than policy variables. If k exceeds the minimum reserve
ratio it may be considered a behavioral parameter; if it equals the minimum reserve ratio
when bank managements would prefer to operate with a lower reserve ratio, k would be a
policy setting. The value of m is taken to be a behavioral parameter.  If z represents the
public's marginal currency-deposit ratio, then m = (1 + z)/(k + z)).
Next, there are the "seasonality" coefficients for the variables p, e, A*, L*, E*, M, T, H,








(F.8)  z(L*), and
(F.9)  z(T),
For simplicity, the seasonality coefficients for F and Q are assumed to be 0.5.
A final assumption introduces valuation change in the central bank's assets:
(G.1)  vH represents the growth in the valuation of the central bank's holdings of
commercial-bank obligations over the period. Thus, for example, a negative value of
VH  could represent a credit loss taken by the central bank on liquidity credit to
commercial banks.
5. The forecasting model
For each forecast year, the model determines the (maximum) net government borrowing
requirement consistent with the programmed macroeconomic and forecast external
accounts as the sum of (i) net external borrowing, (ii) net central-bank lending to the
government, and (iii) the flow change in domestic government obligations outstanding to
financial markets excluding the central bank, as follows. First, (i) the government's net
external borrowing is calculated from the exogenous assumptions. Next, (ii) the
monetary programming exercise is applied to calculate net central-bank lending to the
government. Finally, (iii) the flow change in domestic non-central bank government
obligations outstanding is calculated from the year-average and the preceding year-end
stock.
The monetary programming exercise begins by applying the money-demaLnd  function to
calculate year-average money demand. The flow change in the money supply is then
calculated from the year-average and the preceding year-end stocks. The assumed money
multiplier is then applied to forecast the change in the monetary base.  The flow changes
in the central bank's gross external assets and liabilities, domestic non-monetary
liabilities, and loans to financial institutions, along with the average stocks and the
interest flows deriving from them, are brought in from the assumptions. The central
13bank's flow balance-sheet identity is then used simultaneously to calculate the increase in
net central-bank lending to the government and the flow increase in the central bank's
capital position through profit. Net central-bank lending to the government is the
difference between the increase in central-bank loans to the government and the increase
in the government's deposit balance at the central bank.  The (maximum) net government
borrowing flow consistent with the programmed macroeconomic objectives and the
forecast external accounts is then obtained, as noted, by summing net external borrowing,
the flow change in domestic non-central bank government obligations outstanding, and
net central-bank lending to the governnent.
The model's equations are as follows. First, forecasts of (1) the year-average price level
and (2) exchange rate, (3) the year-end exchange rate, (4) nominal and (5) real GDP, and
(6) GDP in U.S. dollars are calculated from the previous year's values and the assumed
growth rates, as follows. First, the year-average price level and exchange rate:
P= P  1  + g),  (1)
e=  e 1 (I + g).  (2)
Next, assuming that the period-average exchange rate is the weighted geometric mean of
the current and previous year's period-end values, the forecast period-end exchange rate
may then be calculated using the formnula
e  =  e1 (1+g  ) where
1  +g=  [(e l/e  _1)  (I + g)]  /z(e).  (3)
For the domestic-currency, real, and U.S.-dollar values of GDP,
Y =  Y-1 (1 + gy), where
(  + gy)  =  (  + g  (  + g);  (4)
y  = y 1(+  gy);  (5)
and
Y* =  Y* I (1 + g  )/(  + g);  (6)
y  e
14The monetary programming exercise determines the maxirmum  net borrowing the
government could obtain from the central bank given the policy objectives. The basic
approach is to forecast the flow increases in the central bank's assets and liabilities and
then calculate the available increase in central-bank lending to the govemrnent by
subtraction, using the flow balance-sheet identity. The basic approach can be understood
from the central bank's balance sheet:
CENTRAL-BANK  BALANCE SHEET
Assets  Liabilities
Gross external assets  (A)  External liabilities  (L)
Domestic assets:  Domestic liabilities:
Government obligations  (F)  Monetary base:  (B)
Commercial-bank  obligations  (H)  Currency in circulation  (C)
Bank reserves  (R)
Government deposit account  (Q)
Non-monetary domestic liabilities  (U)
Net worth:  (V)
of which, government capital  (K)
The model determines the flow changes in the values of L, B, Q, U, H, and A, then solves
simultaneously for the flow changes in the values of F and V.
The model sets out by calculating the economy's average holding of broad money over
the year, and from this computes the change in broad money outstanding over the year:
M  (  + g_)  (I  g  )X(M)  (7)
p  y
and
AM = M[I  {[(M/M 1)]I(M)]  -1}.  (8)
The period-end value of M is then calculated as
M =  M 1 +AM.  (9)
The flow increases in the monetary base and its components are given by
AB =  AM/m,  (10)
AR = k AM [1  - (1/m)]/[1-k],  (11)
and
AC = [AB  - AR],  (12)
15with "in"  representing the marginal money multiplier and "k" the reserve ratio
maintained by banks (either the minimum required by the monetary authority or a higher
amount according to bank managers' preferences).  (The formula for AR follows from
noting that M = C + D, B =C  + R, so that C = M  - D = B - R; since B =AM/r  and R
kAD,
AM [1 - (l/m)]/[l-k]  = D - kD,
and
AR = kAD,
the formula follows directly.) The period-end stocks of B, R and C are given by
B  =  B  +AB;  (13)
R =  R1 +AR;  (14)
C =  C-1 +AC.  (15)
The flow increases in central-bank non-government domestic lending, AH, and in central-
bank non-monetary liabilities, AU, are assumptions. The period-end stocks are given by
H =  H_+AH  (16)
and
U  =  U 1 +AU.  (17)
As noted above, the flow increases incorporate capitalized interest and valuation change.
In an actual modeling exercise an analyst who introduces a forecast of, say, a valuation
loss on commercial-bank obligations to the central bank would need to change both
assumptions C-1 (AH) and G-1 (vH).
Some intricacies arise in the formulas for the increase in the foreign-exchange value of
the central bank's external asset and liability holdings. The overall increases in their
respective U.S.-dollar values, AA* and AL*, are assumptions. The difference AA* - AL*
is the change in the central bank's net external asset position in U.S. dollars.  In domestic-
currency terms this difference is given by
AA  -AL =  e (A* -L*)  - e_1 (A*  -L*-).  (18)
16The "revaluation" component of the increase in the domestic-currency equivalent of the
central bank's net external asset position (comprising both the cross-currency and the
exchange-rate valuation increases) is given then by
(AA  - AL) - e  (AA* - AL*).  (19)
This formula also gives the net foreign-assets revaluation component of the central bank's
profit flow and hence, as explained below, of the increase in the central bank's
capitalization  position.  The period-end value of the central bank's foreign-exchange net
asset position is given by
A - L  =  (A_ 1 -L 1)  +  (AA -AL).  (20)
The period-average stocks of these assets and liabilities (which are used be:low  in the
calculation of the central bank's profit and loss account) are given by'
R  = R 1[-z(R)]Rz(R)  (21)
U  = u  [1 - Z(U)I  Uz(U)  (22)
H  =  H_  1[I - z(H)  Hz(H)  (23)
A  *  =  AX  [1 - z(A*)] A*z(A*)  (24)
and
L*=  L*  [I - z(L*)]  L*z(L*)  (25)
The most intricate part of the solution procedure is the calculation of the government's
net borrowing from the central bank. This is a two-step procedure to deterrnine AF and
AQ: either AQ takes on its minimum value A'Q and equation 26a below gives AF, or AF
takes on its minimum value A'F and equation 26b gives AQ. The central bank's flow
balance-sheet identity implies that
AF - AQ =  AB - (AA -AL) - (AH - AU) + AV.
The change in the central bank's net worth is given by the sum of (i) the central bank's net
interest bill and (ii) the valuation increase in its external assets:
lThe  writer  is grateful  to Luis Serven  for suggesting  the weighting  used in  the following  formulas.
17AV =  e (Hj*  A*  - iiL L*)  - HR  R  +  (nfH  H  - nu  U)
+  (H  F  F  - nQ  Q)  +  [(AA - AL) - e  (AA* - AL*)] - vHH 1  + AK.
A formula for the government's net borrowing from the central bank net of interest can
be obtained by substituting this last expression into the preceding expression and
rearranging:
(AF- iiF  F)  - (AQ-  iiQ  Q)  =  AK - vHH  +  (AB-ffR  R)
+  (AU- iiu  U)  - (AH- hH  H)  - e  [AA  - H,  A*)
- (A  L*  - HL*  L*)].
Note that
F  F_I [1 + (AF/F_ 1)]° 0 5 = F_ 1 (1 + g0
and
OQ= Q I [1 + (AQIQ 1)]0 5 =  Q 1 (1 + gQ)5
The procedure for calculating AF and AQ uses the assumptions regarding the minimum
increases in their values, A'F and A'Q, as follows. Assume that F 1 and Q I are greater
than zero.
(a)  To begin, set AQ =  A'Q and solve
AF - nF F  =  -(I+a)F_l,
for AF, where
a  =  -{(AB-  nR  R)  + (AU- iiu  U)  - (AH-  nH H)
- e  [AA*  - n-A A*)  - (A  L*  - H* L*)]  + (AQ-IiQQ)
- F 1 + vHH_I+AK}/F_l'
with AQ =  A'Q and Q  =  [Q_ 1 (Q_ 1 + A'Q)]
18The result is
AF/F 1 =  {(iF/2)+_[(F  2/4)-a] 0 5}2 1.  (26a)
This solution may be computed as follows. Since
AF  - iYF  F  =  -(1+a)F_
F  1 AF/F 1 - nF F 1 (1 +  _F)  =  -(1 + a) F 1,
or
-F  - HF (1  +  0  _-(1  +a).
Adding (1 + a) to both sides,
(1 + gF)  - nF (1 + g17)  05+  a  =  O.
This equation may be solved for (1 + g0  5 using the quadratic formula, and then for
(1 + g0  to obtain the formula (26a). (The quadratic solution arises from the use of
geometric averaging. The larger of the two roots would be the appropriate solution.) If
the value of AF given by formula (26a) exceeds -F_1, it is the solution, with AQ =  A'Q.
(b)  If the value of AF given by formula (26a) is less than -A'F 1 , the solution is then
found by setting AF =  -A'F_ 1 and solving
AQ  - fQQ  =-(  + 0) Q  1
for AQ, where
=  {(AB- iR  R)  +  (AU-  iiu  U)  - (AH-  nH  H)
e  ~  [AA*-  n~  A*)  - (AL*  - nH  L*)]  - (AF-  niF)
+ Q-1 + vHH_l  + AK}/Q_ 1,
0.5 with AF  =  A'F and  F =  [F_ 1 (F 1 + A'F)]
19In this case the result is
AQ/Q_ 1 =  {(iiQ/2)_[(ffQ 2/4)  _ 0 5}2 1.  (26b)
The solution calculation for AQ is essentially the same as for formula (26a).
It is helpful to calculate AF even for economies where the government is not permitted to
borrow from the central bank.  In fact, for such economies it is particularly useful to
determine whether the model calculates a value for AF greater than zero, precisely
because in such economies the macroeconomic programming values leading to this result
must on this account be considered infeasible. 2
The economy's period-average holding of government and central-bank obligations
together is given by
T  =T  _1  (  + g))  x(T)  (27)
p  y)
The change over the year in the demand for domestic government bills and bonds is
given then by
_  - - ~~~~[1/z(T)]  (8
AT  =T_1 {[(T±+U)/(T  -l ± U  - 1  - AU.  (28)
The period-end stock of domestic government debt excluding the central bank's holdings
is given by
T  - U =  T 1 U 1 +  AT - AU.  (29)
Intricacies similar to those involving the central bank's external asset and liability
holdings arise in the formulas for the domestic-currency value of the government's
external debt. The assumed overall increase in its outstanding value is AE*, and the
period-end value is given by
E*  = E*_  1+  AE*.
The period-average stock of the U.S.-dollar value of the government's external debt is
given by
E*  E*  [1  - z(E*)] Ez(E*).  (30)
2 The writer is grateful to Antonio Velandia for raising this question.
20In domestic-cuwrency  terms the overall increase in its outstanding value is given by
AE =  eE*  - e  E*  - (31)
The flow of new government external borrowing less repayment in domestic-currency
terms is given by
e AEE*,  (32)
and the overall "revaluation" component of the increase in the domestic-currency
equivalent of the government's outstanding external debt (comprising both the cross-
currency and the exchange-rate valuation increases) is given by
AE - e AE*.  (33)
The (maximum) net government borrowing flow consistent with the policy assumptions
is given then by
Z  = (AF  -AQ)  + AT + e  AE*.  (34)
Since the government's net interest bill is given by
(nF  F  - nQ Q)  +  nT (T  - U)  +  (e  nE E  (35)
-(HF  F  - ii  nT (T  - U)  +  (e  "-E E  (36)
gives the (maximum) primary (non-interest) net government borrowing flow consistent
with the macroeconomic programming assumptions.
6. Analyzing forecasting results
It is not always obvious a priori just how particular changes in the vector of
macroeconomic objectives would affect the maximum allowable net government
borrowing (which is, of course, one of the reasons to use a model like this).  For example,
in general, for any given year, one would expect higher targeted values for real GDP
growth or inflation to imply a higher maximum allowable borrowing requirement in
domestic-currency terms.  These changes would imply a higher demand for money,
which would translate into a larger allowable monetary-base growth, and so, all other
things being equal, a larger allowable amount that the central bank could lend to the
government (or a larger allowable amount that the government could draw down from its
deposit account).  It is important to remember, however, that these effects would  be in
domestic-currency terms.  Higher GDP growth and inflation would also imply higher
nominal GDP. The effects of increases in the assumed values of real GDP growth and
inflation on the maximum allowable net government borrowing as a percentage of GDP
21depend on the parameter assumptions and their inter-relationships, and could, in
principle, go either way.  The model and its details should be helpful precisely in
showing these consequences and helping to understand them.
It is important also to remember that changes in the values of the macroeconomic
objectives would also affect the external accounts, and this should be taken into account
when using the present model.  For example, all other things being equal, higher targeted
values for real GDP growth or inflation should increase imports, thus reducing the
international-reserve inflow.  Since this would imply a smaller increase in the central-
bank asset stock, the consequence should be a larger maximum amount that the central
bank could lend to the government (or a larger maximum amount that the government
could draw down from its deposit account). This would reinforce the probable positive
consequence of the increased demand for money for the maximum net borrowing
requirement.
An increase in the targeted exchange-rate depreciation could affect the maximum net
government borrowing requirement in different ways, It is worth noting, however, that
the effect of such an increase on the maximum government deficit should not depend on
whether the central bank's initial net foreign-exchange asset position is positive or
negative. While a faster rate of currency depreciation would imply a larger increase in
the central bank's net foreign-exchange asset position if the position is initially positive-
a source of monetary expansion-the  full amount of this change would go into the central
bank's profit flow-a  source of monetary absorption. The overall monetary
consequence, hence the effect on the maximum net borrowing requirement, would be
entirely neutralized. Again, the consequences for currency depreciation on international-
reserve accumulation would need to be taken into account. Since it is presumably
positive, all other things being equal, a higher rate of currency depreciation should
generally imply a smaller maximum net government borrowing requirement.
Once the maximum net government borrowing flow has been computed for any given
vector of macroeconomic objectives and set of parameter assumptions, the next step is to
determine whether it is consistent with the government's plans and possibilities-i.e.,
whether the govemment is able, given political and contractual constraints, to run a net
borrowing flow as low as this maximum. This step is beyond the scope of the model
discussed here, which focuses on the "below-the-line" fiscal accounts (but no less
essential for that).  The analyst would want to apply the same vector of macroeconomic
objectives to forecast the "above-the-line" accounts, to deternine whether the overall
fiscal surplus or deficit would then fall within the below-the-line constraint. In some
instances, changed assumptions can lead to complicated consequences. In general, for
example, a reduction in the assumed real-GDP growth rate may be expected to imply a
lower maximum net borrowing requirement. The same change would imply a higher
above-the-line net borrowing requirement, however, because it would imply lower tax
revenue.
The analyst may  also wish to determine whether the banking system is capable of
supporting the macroeconomic programming vector. The model as set out here does not
incorporate the banking system explicitly, but since the model does include monetary
deposit stocks and the money multiplier, a maximum bank-credit stock could be
22computed on the basis of a few additional assumptions. Some of this credit would
presumably go to the govermnent and the central bank, in the form of commercial-bank
purchases of government and central-bank obligations. The remainder could be assumed
to be credit going for the economy's productive and commercial systems. One rapid
consistency check would be a comparison of the growth rates of this kind of credit and of
GDP. If the growth rate of banking-system "productive" credit is significantly less than
the programmed GDP growth rate, the analyst might conclude that the GDP growth rate
is, at least fromn  this standpoint, unlikely to prove feasible.
As noted at the outset, the model described here is conceived as forming part of a broader
macroeconomic consistency analysis, encompassing the full range of an economy's
external, fiscal and monetary relationships.  A given set of macroeconomic objectives
may imply a particular maximum net government borrowing requirement, i.e., a
particular below-the-line maximum government deficit. If the same set of
macroeconomic objectives implies a higher above-the-line deficit, then, of course, either
the analyst would want to change the macroeconomic objectives or propose policy
measures to reduce the above-the-line deficit.
7. The  central  bank's  capital  position
The model's calculated forecasts include the central bank's own period-end and period-
average net worth.  For any year, a given vector of macroeconomic objectives may imply
a significant increase or decrease in this variable, in real terms, as a percentage of GDP,
or as a percentage of the central bank's asset position. If the central bank's capital
position is growing at a rate significantly below that of GDP (not to mention below zero),
the analyst may wish to consider what this implies for the programming assumptions.
The significance of a central bank's capitalization is a matter of some controversy (see
Stella 1997, Beckerman 1997). In a simple sense, a central bank's net worth measures
the extent to which the monetary base is quantitatively "backed" by the cenitral  bank's net
international and domestic assets. To be sure, this measure is a limited indlicator  of
"backing," since it takes no account of the liquidity of the central bank's net asset
position-that  is, it takes no account of the extent to which the central bank really could
deploy its asset base if need be to absorb its outstanding liquidity issue. Nevertheless, at
the present level of analysis, it seems reasonable enough to take the view that, all other
things being equal, changes in the central bank's net worth correspond to c  hanges in the
backing of the monetary base.
It is unclear how much such changes matter in practical terms for macroeconomic
performance. It is unclear to what extent economic agents take account of changes in the
backing of the monetary base in determining their behavior-in  the way, for example,
that their views regarding international-reserve levels often influence exchange rates. In
most nations, at most times, most people are simply oblivious to movements in their
central bank's net worth.  Where such changes are large, persistent and negative,
however, they can matter, in at least two ways. First, to the extent a central bank's net
worth diminishes, its quantitative capacity to carry out monetary policy dirninishes.
(Again, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the liquidity of the central bank's net
23asset position  is at least  as important  as its quantitative  size.) Second,  at some  point,
economic  agents  may  perceive  that the "backing"  of their money  has diminished
significantly,  and this change  in perception  may  produce  a "step"  decline  in the demand
for money.
In several  instances,  the stocks  and flows  of central-bank  net worth  have  become
significant  in these ways. The experiences  of Chile and Argentina  are well-known
examples.  Chile's quasi-fiscal  deficit,  which  originated  mainly  in the Central  Bank's
loans  to commercial  banks that  had become  decapitalized  in the crisis  of the early 1980s,
has never  been sufficiently  large  to prevent  the country  from stabilizing  and growing
impressively,  but has been a standing  problem  for the monetary  authority's  full
effectiveness  (see Eyzaguirre  and Larraniaga  1990). The quasi-fiscal  losses  per se have
been a source  of money  creation,  and  that nation's Central  Bank  therefore  had to run
tighter  monetary  policy  than would  otherwise  have  been  required. The Argentine  Central
Bank's so-called  quasi-fiscal  deficit  became  the engine  of the hyperinflation  in the late
1980s  (see Giorgio  1989  and Beckerman  1995). It arose  mainly  from an attempt  to
tighten  monetary  control  using  high reserve  requirements  and sales of Central  Bank
obligations.  In the mid-l980s,  tightened  monetary  policy  and the unusually  high
inflationary  uncertainty  then  prevailing  forced  commercial  banks to pay high rates to
maintain  their deposit  base. The Central  Bank  began  paying  high rates on its obligations
to the banks  to enable  them  to maintain  positive  operating  spreads. Since  the Central
Bank's earnings  on its asset position  were inadequate  to cover  its interest  bill, it ran a
high deficit,  which  it financed  with further  issues  of obligations  (including  capitalization
of interest  into  the stocks  of remunerated  reserves). By the end of 1989  these obligations
and  their interest  bill had accumulated  so massively  that  the Central  Bank  found  itself in
acute  distress,  with interest  rates  rising  sharply  and the price level surging. Over  the New
Year's weekend  of 1990,  the authorities  carried  out the "BONEX  conversion,"  paying  out
these  obligations  once  and for all to commercial  banks,  and ultimately  to the banks'
depositors,  in dollar-denominated  External  Bonds  yielding  LIBOR. Commercial  banks
who  held  the Central  Bank's obligations  were required  to pass  the BONEX  on to their
depositors.  The BONEX  immediately  took a deep  market  discount  (which  was the form
in which  the Central  Bank  effectively  "liquidated"  its debt). In April  1991,  the
authorities  fixed  the exchange  rate and introduced  a partial  currency  board  through  the
"Convertibility  Law." This policy  proved  successful  in reducing  inflation,  and-among
its other  consequences-gradually  increased  BONEX  valuations  to normal  levels  for
external  debt. (Argentina's  Central  Bank  has resumed  the practice  of remunerating  bank
reserves,  but does  so from a solid asset base  now consisting  mainly  of international
reserves.)
As  these examples  show,  central  banks can earn  profits  and  take losses  on various
accounts  (see  Beckerman  1997). These  include  interest  receipts  and  payments  generally,
foreign-exchange  operations,  and  treasury  operations  in foreign  and domestic  financial
markets. Some  central  banks carry  out operations  more  appropriately  carried  out as fiscal
operations;  for example,  governments  have  sometimes  used  central  banks to pay
subsidies. Some  central  banks  have been  decapitalized  by contingent  liabilities. For
example,  some  central  banks had  to honor  costly exchange-rate  guarantees.  (See
Polackova  1998  for a discussion  of the dangers  of public-sector  contingent  liabilities
generally.)
24For present  purposes,  one  point of including  the central  bank's capital  position  in the
model is to determine whether the macroeconomic  program settings wouldl  imply a sharp
or continuing  reduction  in the central  bank's capital  position. A forecast  of a rapidly
declining  capital  position  would  suggest  that  the macroeconomic  program  settings  might
ultimately  prove  infeasible.  A higher  inflation  rate, a different  structure  of central-bank
interest  rates,  or higher  exchange-rate  depreciation  might be required  to ensure  that the
central  bank maintains  an adequate  capital  position. In fact,  the problem  rnay simply  be
that  the central  bank is under-capitalized  from the outset:  with a larger  initial capital
position  (and  the corresponding  assets),  the central  bank would  earn  a higher  profit flow
from  the outset,  and this capital  position  may  therefore  be more likely  to prove
sustainable.
Just as for public  deficits  generally,  for certain  purposes  it is appropriate  to calculate  a
central  bank's profit-and-loss  account  adjusted  for inflation. That is, the central  bank's
profit-and-loss  flow may  be decomposed  into "inflation"  and "real" components.  The
inflation  component  reflects  the real-value  losses  sustained  by the central  lbank's  assets
and  liabilities  as a consequence  of inflation:  the losses  on the assets  subtract  from  and the
losses  on the liabilities  add to the central  bank's profit. The profit  or loss resulting  from
inflation  may  be estimated  both for past and future  by multiplying  the difference  between
the period-average  domestic-currency  values  of the central  bank's assets and liabilities  by
-gpI  /+gp),  where  gp represents  the inflation  rate  over the period. The "real" component
of the central  bank's profit  flow may  be calculated  by subtracting  the "inflation"
component  from the overall  profit  flow.
It is difficult  to say how large  a net-worth  position  a central  bank ought  to maintain-just
as, in fact,  it has proven  difficult  to provide  analytical  foundations  for the "Basel"  capital-
adequacy  norrns  for commercial  banks,  which  set  the appropriate  capital  position  as a
percentage  of "risk-weighted"  assets. For a central  bank,  it may  be conjectured  that the
appropriate  capital  position  would  be that  which,  over  time,  can be held  stable in relation
to the institution's  asset base,  with the growth  of the capital  base coming  entirely  from
the central  bank's own  profit flow. For the discussion  following only, let A represent  the
central  bank's total net-asset  base (incorporating  the monetary  base as a negative  item),
V its net worth,  and AV  its annual  profit  flow. The ratio  V/A  would  remaiin  constant  if
AVIV  = AAIA
g A
or, rearranging,  if
V/A = (AV  /A)/gA
-that  is, if the net worth as a percentage  of the asset stock  were equal to the ratio of
(i) the central  bank's return  on its assets  to (ii)  the asset growth  rate. The long-term  asset-
growth  rate would  presumably  be the same  as the real-GDP  growth  rate. The appropriate
long-term  central-bank  net worth as a percentage  of its asset  base, V/A,  to be maintained
25over time would then be that value for which the resulting AV would maintain this last
equality. This would depend in turn on the central bank's asset and liability structure and
also on its interest-rate structure.
8. Concluding  remarks
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that the model presented here is a consistency
framework, not a behavioral model, and much less a prediction exercise.  The model's
purpose is only to determine the government deficit consistent with a particular vector of
macroeconomic objectives. In particular country contexts, demonstration of such
consistency may be a particularly important selling point for a particular macroeconomic
program: consistency and feasibility are obviously essential attributes of any practical
macroeconomic program. All the same, the fact that a macroeconomic program can be
shown to be consistent, even feasible cannot be taken to imply that the program would be
technically straightforward for policy-makers to implement, nor that the deficit would
even be appropriate from a longer-term perspective.
26REFERENCES
Asian Wall Street Journal (1993). "Manila Struggles to Revive Central Bank," June 4,
p. 1.
Bagehot, Walter (1873). Lombard Street (London).
Beckerman, Paul (1997).  "Central Bank Decapitalization in Developing Economies."
World Development, Vol. 25, No. 2 (February), pp. 167-178.
Beckerman, Paul (1995).  "Central Bank 'Distress' and Hyperinflation in Argentina,
1989-90."  Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 27, Part 3 (October), pp. 663-682.
Beckerman, Paul (1991). The Economics of High Inflation. (Macmillan; Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire).
Blejer, Mario and A. Cheasty (1991). "Analytical and Methodological Issues in the
Measurement of the Fiscal Deficit." Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XXIX,
No. 4 (December), pp. 1644-78.
Cukierman, Alex (1992). Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and  Independence: Theory
and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press).
Eyzaguirre, Nicolas and Osvaldo Larrafiaga (1990),"Macroeconomia  de las operaciones
cuasifiscales en Chile," paper presented at the Second Regional Seminar on Fiscal,
Adjustment and Stabilization  Policy organized by the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), Santiago de Chile, August.
Giorgio, Luis Alberto (1989).  "Crisis  financieras, reestructuracion bancaria e
hiperinflaci6n en la Argentina," working paper (December).
Le Houerou, Philippe and Hector Sierra (1993).  "Estimating Quasi-Fiscal I)eficits in a
Consistency Framework." World Bank Working Paper Series (February), No. 1105.
Leone, Alfredo M. (1993). "Institutional and Operational Aspects of Central Bank
Losses," International Monetary Fund Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment
No. 93/14, September.
Leontiev, Wassily and members of the Harvard Research Project (1952).  Studies in the
Structure of the American Economy (New York: Oxford University Press).
Piekarz, Julio A. (1987) "El deficit cuasifiscal del Banco Central," paper presented in the
Seminar on Central Bank Quasi-Fiscal Operations (Brasilia, August), Center for
Latin American Monetary Studies.
27REFERENCES, continued
Piekarz, Julio A. (1984). "Compensaci6n de reservas de efectivo minimo: La Cuenta de
Regulacion Monetaria, el resultado cuasi fiscal del Banco Central y la
transformaci6n del sistemafinanciero argentino," Ensayos Econ6micos,
September 1984.
Polackova, Hana (1998). "Contingent Government Liabilities." World Bank Working
Paper Series (October), No. 1989.
Rezende Rocha, R. and F. Saldanha (1992). "Fiscal and Quasi-Fiscal Deficits, Nominal
and Real." World Bank Working Paper Series (October), No. 919.
Robinson, D. and P. Stella (1988). "Amalgamating Central Bank and Fiscal Deficits," in
Blejer, M. and K. Chu, Measurement of Fiscal Impact: Methodological Issues
(International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.)
Rodriguez, Carlos A. (1993). "Quasi-Fiscal Deficits: Latin American Lessons for South
Asia, World Bank South Asia Region Internal Discussion Paper (IDP-129), August.
Rodriguez, Carlos A. and Aquiles Almansi (1989). "Reforma monetaria yfinanciera  en
hiperinflaci6n." Center for Macroeconomic Studies of Argentina (CEMA), Buenos
Aires, Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 67 (August).
Sargent, Thomas and Neil Wallace (1981). "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Fall, pp. 1-  18.
Stella, Peter (1997). "Do Central Banks Need Capital?" (Working Paper, International
Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.), July.
Teijeiro, Mario 0. (1989) "Central Bank Losses: Origins, Conceptual Issues." World Bank
Working Paper Series (October), No. 293.
28Annex. An illustrative forecast for Ecuador
Ecuador's  economy  in mid-1999  provides  a test case  for the methodology  proposed  in
this paper. The  figures andforecasts  presented  here are intended  exclusively  to
illustrate  the model  described  in this  paper,  and do not necessarily  indicate  the views  of
the writer,  much less the World  Bank,  regarding  Ecuador's  likely  economic
performance  in 1999  and 2000.
Table I below  summarizes  Ecuador's  recent  macroeconomic  performance,  and provides
balance-of£payments  forecasts  and base-case  programming  forecasts  for 1999  and 2000.
These  calculations  were made  in mid-1999.  Even after  nearly  two decades  of
unsatisfactory  economic  performance-1998 per-capita  GDP and  private  consumption
were at virtually  the same  levels as in 1981-Ecuador was expected  to suffer a severe
recession  in 1999,  as a consequence  of a confluence  of external  shocks,  that took place
during  1998  and  problematic  implementation  of stabilization  policies. In the "base
scenario,"  real  GDP would  decline  by 5.5 per cent and  the price level  would  rise 55  per
cent  (December  to December),  while  the exchange  rate would  undergo  a year-average-
on-year-average  depreciation  of about  28 per cent. As a consequence,  the performance  of
the external  accounts  would  improve  sharply,  with  the current-account  deficit  declining
from  more  than 11  per cent  in 1998  to around  2 per cent (this was determined  using an
external-accounts  spreadsheet  forecasting  model).
For present  purposes,  Ecuador's  central-government  deficit  is taken  to be the appropriate
"government"  concept  rather  than  the overall  public-sector  financing  requirement.  The
public-sector  financing  requirement  encompasses  not only the central  government,  but
also  the provincial  and  municipal  governments  and the operating  losses  of publicly-
owned  enterprises.  None  of these  entities  is permitted  to borrow  directly  from  the
Central  Bank.
Table  2a gives  the basic results  for an estimate  of the central-government  deficit  that
would  be consistent  with based  on the same  assumptions.  It also givess  the summary  of
the central-bank  profit flow  that would  be implied. The base data for the calculation  were
from  the International  Monetary  Fund's International  Monetary  Statistics  (IFS),  as given
in the "Monetary  Survey"  section  for Ecuador.  The assumptions  underlying  the
calculation  are given in Table  2b, corresponding  to the assumptions  listed in Section  3 of
the main  text. The assumptions  in Table  2b are set out in the seven  categories  (letters
A-G)  given  in Section  3 of the main  text. The assumption  category  A comprises  the
general  macroeconomic  programming  assumptions,  including  real GDP  growth,  inflation,
the real-effective  exchange  rate. Category  B comprises  the assumptionis  drawn  from the
external-accounts  forecasting  exercise  (carried  out separately  by the writer). Category  C
comprises  assumptions  regarding  the increases  over each  year in the Central  Bank's
domestic  assets and liabilities.  Category  D comprises  assumptions  regarding  nominal
interest  rates applying  to the Central  Bank's domestic  assets  and liabil.ities.  These  are set
in the spreadsheet  as formulas  with real interest  rates  (r) adjusted  for each  year's assumed
December-December  inflation  rate (x) using the formula  (r-x)/(l  +x). Assumption
category  E comprises  the key behavioral  assumptions  for money  demand  and  supply,
29including the base-money multiplier and the elasticities of money demand with respect to
real GDP and December-December inflation. Category F comprises the seasonality
coefficients (all set in the present exercise to 0.5). Finally, assumption category G gives
the assumed valuation change in the Central Bank's stock of commercial-bank assets
(taken here to be zero).
The forecasting results in Table 2a suggest that in order to achieve the programmed
macroeconomic values Ecuador's central government would have had to hold to fairly
tight limits on its central-government deficit, not exceeding 2.3 per cent of GDP in 1999
and 1.7 per cent in 2000.  With the public interest bill forecast to run between 6 and 8 per
cent of GDP during the two years, the non-interest (primary) surplus would have had to
remain at austerity levels in order to achieve the programmed targets.  For comparison,
Ecuador's central-government budget deficit reached 1.9, 1.5 and 2.8 per cent in 1996,
1997, and 1998, respectively, as shown in Table 1. The central bank would run a fairly
substantial nominal profit, but this would mainly result from exchange-rate depreciation.
Under the assumptions given, the nominal profit deriving from net interest income would
be only about 0.8 per cent of GDP.
Table 3 shows the results of varying the assumed macroeconomic objectives. In the
sensitivity analysis, assumed real GDP growth for 1999 is varied between -4, -5.5, and -7
per cent, while the inflation rate for the year is varied between 40, 55, and 70 per cent.
For all the first nine simulations, the real-effective exchange rate is assumed to depreciate
about 28 per cent year over year, corresponding to a December-December  real-effective
depreciation of 20 per cent.  For 2000, real GDP is assumed to grow at I per cent in all
scenarios while the inflation rate is assumed to be one half that of 1999. The results of
different simulations are shown in the rows, with two rows per simulation for each year.
The results given in the first nine simulations indicate that the central bank's profitability
is quite sensitive to the assuned inflation rate, but the maximum government deficit is
fairly robust, coming out around 2 to 2.5 per cent for all the scenarios. In the last three
scenarios, the real-effective exchange rate is assumed to depreciate about 24.8 per cent,
corresponding  to a December-December real-effective depreciation of 10 per cent. The
maximum government deficit is slightly higher than in the first three simulations, while
the central-bank profit is considerably lower.
The present model offers a wide range of opportunities for "scenario-testing," to
determnine  the fiscal and monetary stance most appropriate to meet policy-makers'
macroeconomic  objectives.
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1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
(forecast)  (forecast)
Growth rates (per cent):
Gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices  5.0  3.6  2.0  4.4  2.3  2.9  3.3  0.4  -5.5  1.0
Per-capita GDP  2.6  1.2  -0.3  2.0  0.0  0.6  1.0  -1.9  -7.6  -1.3
Consumer prices  48.8  54.3  45.0  27.4  22.9  24.4  30.6  43.4  55.0  27.5
Real-effective exch. rate (1990 = 100; + = appreciation)  106.5  109.0  124.8  133.5  132.3  130.7  134.2  135.4  145.7  145.7
National  accounts (per cent of current  GDP):
Gross fixed capital formation  19.7  19.5  19.9  18.8  18.6  17.8  19.0  21.0  18.5  19.5
Natior.al saving  16.1  20.2  16.3  14.9  14.6  17.9  16.4  13.6  15.6  17.2
Foreign saving (current-account deficit)  6.0  1.0  4.7  4.1  4.1  -0.6  3.8  11.0  2.9  2.3
Domestic saving  23.8  25.0  21.7  22.0  20.7  24.4  21.2  18.5  21.6  22.8
Resource gap  -1.7  -3.8  -0.6  -3.0  -2.0  -7.1  -1.0  6.2  -3.1  -3.3
Central-government surplus (per cent of GDP):  0.1  0.5  -0.1  -1.3  -1.9  -1.5  -2.8
Total revenue:  14.7  16.1  15.7  15.5  17.5  17.5  17.1  14.1
Petroleum  6.9  7.9  7.5  6.4  6.6  8.2  5.9  4.5
Non-petroleum  7.9  8.2  8.2  9.1  10.8  9.3  11.2  9.6
Total expenditure:  -16.0  -15.2  -15.6  -18.8  -19.4  -18.6  -16.8
Current expenditure:  -13.3  -12.8  -12.2  -14.8  -14.8  -14.6  -10.7
Staff remuneration  -6.3  -6.2  -7.5
Interest:  -2.7  -2.4  -1.8  -2.5  -4.5  -3.2  4.0  -3.5
Extemal  -2.2  -1.9  -1.4  -2.1  -4.0  -2.6  -3.0  -2.7
Domestic  -0.5  -0.5  -0.4  -0.4  -0.5  -0.6  -0.9  -0.8
Other current expenditure  -5.3  -4.5  0.2
Capital  expenditure:  -2.7  -2.4  -3.5  -4.0  -4.6  -3.9  -6.1
Primary balance (total revenue less non-int. exp.)  2.5  2.4  2.3  3.2  1.3  2.5  0.7
Saving  (total revenue less current expenditure)  2.8  2.9  3.3  2.7  2.7  2.5  3.3
External accounts (US$ million):
Current-account  balance:  -708.0  -122.0  -678.0  -679.0  -735.0  111.0  -743.0  -2165.2  431.0  -361.4
Merchandise trade:  643.0  1018.0  592.0  563.0  354.0  1220.0  598.0  -1028.6  512,6  573.2
Merchandise exports  2851.0  3101.0  3066.0  3843.0  4411.0  4900.0  5264.0  4133.2  4386.6  4712.8
Merchandise imports (F. 0.  B.)  -2208.0  -2083.0  -2474.0  -3280.0  -4057.0  -3680.0  -4666.0  -5161.8  -3874.1  -4139.5
Othercurrentaccount  -1351.0  -1140.0  -1270.0  -1242.0  -1089.0  -1109.0  -1341.0  -1136.6  -943.6  -934.6
Change in net international reserves  -1010.3  -966.2  -623.7  -766.3  -519.0  -84.0  43.0  -246.3  -43.4  339.8
Total external  debt (US$ million):  12468.0  12280.0  14150.0  15074.0  13992.0  14495.0  14918.0  14756.1  14367.2  14270.5
Public and publicly guaranteed (US$ million)  9951.0  9831.0  9974.0  10552.0  12067.0  12444.0  12376.0  12628.0  12506.0  12308.2
(per cent of GDP)  84.7  77.7  69.7  63.5  67.3  65.4  62.6  64.4  84.2  77.1
Service onterm debt(US$ million)  954.0  859.4  789.6  912.0  1333.0  1229.0  1791.0  1240.2  1271.4  1338.9
(per cent  of.vpnnrts of goods, nonn.ftnr  v--e)  28.0  23.1  21.2  19.9  25.3  21.3  29.9  30.0  29.0  28.4
Gross domestic product (US$ million)  11752.4  12655.9  14304.2  16605.8  17939.4  19039.8  19768.6  19615.7  14859.7  15960.8
Data source: Central Bank of Ecuador: projections by the writer
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1999  2000
Maximum net government borrowing:
Per cent of GDP:  2.3  1.7
Excluding interest  -5.4  -4.6
Interest:  7.8  6.3
External interest  4.5  4.1
"Real" component of domestic interest  0.7  0.4
"Inflation" component of domestic interest  2.6  1.8
US$ million:  345  269
Excluding interest  -809  -740
Interest:  1154  1010
External interest  666  652
"Real" component of domestic interest  106  71
"Inflation" component of domestic interest  382  286
Central-bank  net profit:
Per cent of GDP:  6.0  2.8
Net interest:  0.7  1.2
Interest  earnings on assets:  2.6  2.3
External interest  0.5  0.5
"Real" component of domestic interest  -0.6  -0.2
"Inflation" component of domestic interest  2.8  1.9
Interest payments on liabilities:  -1.9  -1.1
External interest  -0.1  -0.1
"Real" component of domestic interest  -5.6  -3.4
"Inflation" component of domestic interest  2.7  1.7
Real reduction in value of the currency issue  1.1  0.7
Net earnings on exch.-rate depreciation  5.3  1.6
Valuation incr. in central-bank claims on comm. Banks  0.0  0.0
Growth rates:
GDP at 1975 prices  -5.5  1.0
Year-end  consumer  prices  55.0  27.5
GDP deflator  52.2  35.2
Yr.-avg. real-effective. exchange rate (+ = depreciation)  28.0  -3.3
Gross intl. reserves, (mos. of imps. of goods, non-factor  4.0  4.5
services)
Source: Calculation by the writer using the spreadsheet forecasting model.
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1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Growth rates:
GDP at current prices:  26.1  32.0  30.2  35.9  43.9  36.5
GDP at 1975 prices  A-1  2.3  2.9  3.3  0.4  -5.5  1.0
GDP deflator  A-2  23.3  28.2  26.0  35.4  52.2  35.2
Year-end consumer prices  22.8  25.5  30.7  43,4  55.0  27.5
Year-average exchange rate (S./US$)  A-3  16.7  24.4  25.3  37.0  89.9  27.1
Year-end exchange rate (S.LUS$)  28.8  24.3  21.8  50.8  81.3  17.6
Year-average world prices  9.2  -2.5  1.7  2.2  2.6  2.8
Year-end world prices  2.6  3.0
Yr.-avg. real-effective. exchange rate (+  depreciation)  3.5  -5.5  1.3  3.5  28.0  -3.3
Yr.-end real-effective. exchange rate (+ = depreciation)  0.0  -0.9  -6.8  5,2  20.0  -5.0
Period-end  stocks (USS million):
Central-bank (gross) external assets  B-i  2010  1794  2025  2259  1835  1779  2107
Central-bank external liabilities  B-2  4276  417  356  286  298  310  323
Govemment external debt  B-3  10552  12067  12444  12376  12628  12506  12308
U.S.-dollar interest rates (percent/year):
Central-bank (gross) external assets  B-4  5.1  4.6  4.8  4.5  4.0  4.5
Central-bank extemal liabilities  B-5  5.6  5.8  5.7  5.6  5.2  5.2
Government external debt  B-6  5.1  5:1  5.9  5.6  5.3  5.3
Flow increases (S./ billion):
Central-bank claims on commercial banks  C-1  478  441  -780  3223  3091  2388
(percent of GDP)  1.0  0.7  -1.0  3.0  2.0  1.1
Central-bank non-monetary domestic liabilities  C-2  -43  37  24  3223  3091  2491
(percent of GDP)  -0.  0.1  0.0  3.0  2.0  1.2
Minimum flow increases:
Central-bank claims on government  C-3  -8555  35  -33  0  0  0
(percent of GDP)  -18.6  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Government deposit acct. at the central bank  C4  0  659  121  0  0  0
(percent of GDP)  0.0  1.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0
Incr. in the government capital position in the central  C-5  0  0  0
bank
(percent of GDP)  0.0  0.0  0.0
Sucre interest rates (per cent per year);
Central-bank claims on:
Commercial banks  D-1  43.4  38.5  19.3
Government  D-2  20.0  20.0  20.0
Claims on the central bank:
Commercial banks (reserve accounts)  D-3  0.0  0.0  0.0
Govemment deposit account  D-4  0.0  0.0  0.0
Central-bank non-monetary domestic liabilities  D-5  43.4  55.0  27.5
Government domestic debt  D-6  43.4  55.0  27.5
Ratios:
Commercial banks' marginal reserve ratio  E-1  7.1  8.9  8.1  12.0  12.0  12.0
Marginal money multiplier  E-2  8.2  5.7  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0
Implicit marginal currency-deposit ratio  22.1  32.0  35.2  40.0  40.0  40.0
Asset-demand  elasticities
With respect to real GDP:
Broad money supply  E-3  1.2  1.2  1.0
Government and central-bank domestic debt  E-4  1.2  1.2  1.0
Seasonality coefficients:
Price level  F-I  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
Exchange rate (sucres/U.S. dollar)  F-2  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
Broad money supply  F-3  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
Commercial banks' central-bank reserve accounts  F4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
Central-bank non-monetary domestic liabilities  F-5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
Central-bank claims on commercial banks  F-6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
Central-bank (gross) external assets  F-7  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
Central-bank external liabilities  F-8  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
Government and central-bank domestic non-monetary  F-9  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
debt
Valuation change (per cent of previous period-end stock):
Central-bank claims on commercial banks  G-l  0.0  0.0  0.0
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Assumed growth rates:  Per cent of  Increase as a percentage  of GDP:  Per cent of GDP:
GDP:
Real GDP  Consumer  Real-effective  Current-  Monetary  Central-bank  Central-bank  Central-bank  Maximum
prices  exchange  rate  account  base  net  net non-  profit  central-
(Dec./Dec.)  (yr./yr.)  surplus  international  government  government
assets  domestic  deficit
assets
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
(1)  1999  -7.0  70.0  28.0  -1.8  1.9  6.1  0.0  7.0  2.0
2000  1.0  35.0  -3.3  -1.1  2.3  4.6  -0.1  3.3  1.3
(2)  1999  -7.0  55.0  28.0  -1.8  1.8  5.1  0.0  6.2  2.1
2000  1.0  27.5  -3.3  -1.1  2.0  4.0  0.0  2.8  1.1
(3)  1999  -7.0  40.0  28.0  -1.8  1.8  4.1  0.0  5.3  2.2
2000  1.0  20.0  -3.3  -1.1  1.7  3.4  0.0  2.4  1.1
(4)  1999  -5.5  70.0  28.0  -2.9  1.9  5.8  0.0  6.8  2.2
2000  1.0  35.0  -3.3  -2.3  2.4  4.2  -0.1  3.2  1.8
(5)  1999  -5.5  55.0  28.0  -2.9  1.9  4.9  0.0  6.0  2.3
2000  1.0  27.5  -3.3  -2.3  2.0  3.6  0.0  2.8  1.7
(6)  1999  -5.5  40.0  28.0  -2.9  1.8  3.9  0.0  5.2  2.4
2000  1.0  20.0  -3.3  -2.3  1.7  3.0  0.0  2.4  1.7
(7)  1999  -4.0  70.0  28.0  -3.9  2.0  6.2  0.0  6.8  2.0
2000  1.0  35.0  -3.3  -3A  2.5  4.3  -0.1  3.2  2.0
(8)  1999  -4.0  55.0  28.0  -3.9  1.9  5.2  0.0  6.0  2.1
2000  1.0  27.5  -3.3  -3.4  2.1  3.7  0.0  2.8  1.8
(9)  1999  -4.0  40.0  28.0  -3.9  1.9  4.2  0.0  5.2  2.2
2000  1.0  20.0  -3.3  -3.4  1.8  3.1  0.0  2.4  1.8
(10)  1999  -5.5  70.0  24.8  -3.0  1.9  4.9  0.0  5.8  2.2
2000  1.0  35.0  -9.1  -3.1  2.4  4.0  -0.1  3.0  1.9
(11)  1999  -5.5  55.0  24.8  -3.0  1.9  4.0  0.0  5.1  2.3
2000  1.0  27.5  -9.1  -3.1  2.0  3.5  0.0  2.7  1.7
(12)  1999  -5.5  40.0  24.8  -3.0  1.8  3.0  0.0  4.3  2.4
2000  1.0  20.0  -9.1  -3.1  1.7  2.9  0.0  2.3  1.7
Source: Calculation by the writer using the spreadsheet forecasting model.
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